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Comment Michael Hurd
An important aspect of the debate about personal retirement accounts con-
cerns their investment in equities. On the one side, a main reason for having
personal retirement accounts is that indeed they can be invested in equities
that historically have a greater rate of return than bonds and a much greater
rate of return than the internal rate of return on Social Security contribu-
tions. On the other side is the risk that comes with the higher mean rate of
return: there are signiﬁcant chances that a worker could end up worse oﬀ
than under a Social Security system that has no personal retirement ac-
counts. Of particular concern is the risk to low-wage workers who are
unlikely to have other resources to buﬀer against bad outcomes. Conse-
quently, there have been a number of proposals to provide insurance against
these unfavorable outcomes. This chapter points out that the debate need
not be restricted to personal retirement accounts within the structure of the
existing Social Security system. Some of the risk from low rates of return in
private retirement accounts could be partially oﬀset by increased progres-
sivity in the Social Security program. This is an interesting alternative to in-
surance against bad outcomes on rates of return and in some ways would be
preferable: insurance has the undesirable eﬀect of reducing the mean rate of
return on equities because of the cost of insurance. Or said diﬀerently, in-
surance reduces the amount invested in equities partly oﬀsetting the main
reason for having personal retirement account in the ﬁrst place.
The simulations show that there is considerable scope for investing in eq-
uities in personal retirement accounts while protecting the bottom part of
the income distribution via an increase in the progressivity of the Social Se-
curity system. For example, in ﬁgure 9.1, the “half-and-half” progressivity
structure with no investment in equity will provide greater expected utility
for a typical worker in the bottom income decile than the existing structure
fully invested in equities. At the same time, those in the top income decile
could invest about 80 percent in equities and achieve greater expected util-
ity than under the present structure but with no equities (ﬁgure 9.6). Said
diﬀerently, compared with the present situation, the bottom decile could
have greater expected utility and no investment risk, and the top decile
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ing, and a research associate of the National Bureau of Economic Research.could have greater expected utility with investment risk. If we think those
in the bottom part of the income distribution do not want any investment
risk as evidenced by their having few (if any) equities in their portfolios,
while those in the upper income deciles can handle investment risk as evi-
denced by their risk taking in other parts of their portfolios, we might fa-
vor this altered situation. It should be pointed out, however, that scenario
is similar to having insurance against bad outcomes in that the total
amount invested in equities is less than optimal.
The key to this proposal is to increase progressivity. However, greater
progressivity means that Social Security contributions will become more
of a tax and less of an investment. At the extreme of a ﬂat beneﬁt, it is com-
pletely a tax, which has possible labor supply eﬀects and corresponding
deadweight losses. Possibly more important are political economy eﬀects.
Social Security enjoys widespread political support for several reasons, but
probably a leading reason is that it is viewed as an earned right and that
greater participation leads to greater beneﬁts. I believe that policymakers
should be very cautious to disturb that political equilibrium.
The metric used in the chapter to compare the various options is expected
utility. I have some reservations about this approach. Total public pension
beneﬁts are the sum of Social Security beneﬁts and the income ﬂow result-
ing from annuitizing the personal retirement account. Expected utility is
calculated by assuming that consumption equals total beneﬁts. For most
people, however, consumption is not equal to this ﬂow because they have
other economic resources. For example, a well-to-do person will ﬁnance
consumption out of public pension beneﬁts, employer-sponsored pension
beneﬁts including 401k plans, interest and dividends, and from savings
(spend-down of capital). The 2 percent of Social Security earnings with the
current contribution cap is a very small part of the economic resources of
such a person. Thus, the variation in the value of a personal retirement ac-
count due to the stochastic rate of return on equities will not cause much
variation in consumption as a fraction of total consumption. Said diﬀer-
ently, for a well-to-do person, the utility function is practically linear over
the relevant amount of variation induced by stochastic rates of return. This
would not be true of someone who has little other ﬁnancial resources. At
the extreme would be someone with no other resources. Old-Age and Sur-
vivors Insurance (OASI) taxes are 10.6 percent of taxable earnings so that
the 2 percent personal retirement account contribution would amount to
about 16 percent of total economic resources at retirement under the as-
sumption that both Social Security contributions and the personal retire-
ment account have the same rate of return.1 Thus, stochastic variation in
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1. Of course, if the personal retirement account delivers a much greater rate of return, as
would be the case if it were invested in equities at historical market rates of return, it would
accumulate to a much greater fraction of economic resources at retirement.rates of return in the personal retirement account would translate directly
into variation in consumption and in utility.
Samwick does not directly address this issue, but does consider an alter-
native utility function that admits to variation in risk aversion with eco-
nomic status. He observes that low-wealth households have a large fraction
of their portfolios in riskless Social Security, which should lead them to
hold a large fraction of their assets in equities. However, just the opposite
is observed in the data: low-wealth households are unlikely to hold equi-
ties. A possible resolution is that the underlying utility function of low-
wealth households exhibits greater risk aversion. Thus, he proposes an al-
ternative to the constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) utility:
u(b)   ,
where b is consumption and k is necessary expenditures. Under this utility
function, relative risk aversion declines with b, which means that low-
spending households are less likely to hold risky portfolios. While this util-
ity function probably leads to a better description of behavior with respect
to portfolio choice, it does not really address the issue of alternative
sources of ﬁnance for consumption. Furthermore, as implemented, house-
holds at the low end of the consumption distribution become very risk
averse. For example, in ﬁgure 9.7, the 20th percentile of consumption is
about $1,400, and with k   $10,000, a household at the 20th percentile
would have a relative risk aversion parameter of about 10.5. This is an ex-
treme value of risk aversion.
Because of the inability to account for other resources that can be used
for consumption, there is an imprecise correspondence between variation
in total beneﬁt outcomes and variation in utility. Therefore, I prefer anal-
ysis of the distributions of actual beneﬁt outcomes as in ﬁgures 9.7 and 9.8.
For example, in ﬁgure 9.7 with proportional reduction (which has the cur-
rent Social Security beneﬁt structure but at a reduced level), the median
beneﬁt would be about $1,600. There is a 10 percent chance that beneﬁts
would be less than approximately $1,350 and a 10 percent chance they
would be more than approximately $1,950. In my view, this is substantial
beneﬁt risk: the range of the middle 80 percent of the distribution is $600,
which is about 0.38 of the median.
A good deal of the variation in beneﬁts appears to arise from earnings
risk. This can be seen from ﬁgure 9.7 for the “uniform beneﬁt” scenario.
Under this scenario, the Social Security beneﬁt is independent of earnings.
All the variation in beneﬁt comes from the personal retirement account
part of the beneﬁt. Some is due to investment risk and some due to earn-
ings risk because the contribution to the personal retirement account is
proportional to earnings. Even so, the curve is beginning to look like a step
function, which would be the case with no risk. Indeed, the ratio of the
(b   k)1  
  
1   
Changing Progressivity as a Means of Risk Protection 329range of the middle 80 percent to the median is about 0.23. The importance
of pure earnings risk is further shown in ﬁgure 9.8 for the “no equity” sim-
ulation. The same measure of risk is about 0.37.
Apparently earnings risk is an important determinant of the results. It
aﬀects the amount in personal retirement accounts even in the absence of
rate-of-return risk because a ﬁxed percentage of earnings is put into the ac-
count. It aﬀects the beneﬁt from Social Security, but its importance de-
pends on the progressivity of the beneﬁt schedule. It would be useful to
present some information about the contribution of earnings risk to total
risk. But rather than presenting certainty equivalents as in most of the
tables, it would be better to present the ranges of the beneﬁt outcomes.
In summary, the chapter provides an additional way of thinking about
protection against unfavorable outcomes were some part of personal re-
tirement accounts invested in equities. However, the political economy of
the present public support of the Social Security system should be carefully
considered before implementing increased progressivity.
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